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ABSTRACT 
Starting from the reactions to the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015 and 
appeals to Enlightenment values (above all toleration), this article reflects on the 
meaning of the enlightenment today and how to study it. Several examples are 
discussed, which show the diversity and complexity of eighteenth-century think-
ing and the need to adopt a more nuanced and, where necessary, critical atti-
tude towards it. This also applies to the notion of toleration. The study of the 
Enlightenment should help us think more critically about its implications and 
about the ambiguities inherent in our own attitudes. 
After the attack on «Charlie Hebdo» in Paris in January 2015, Vol-
taire’s Traité sur la tolérance became a best-seller and was distri-buted 
free as an e-book by the newspaper «Libération», and in April 2015 
the Société française d’étude du 18e siècle (Sfeds) published a little 
book called Tolérance: le combat des Lumières. The book, composed of 
quotations from around 40 eighteenth-century authors (mainly, but 
not only, French) sent in by members of the Society, was sold in 
newspaper kiosks for the modest price of € 4.90. The Preface, by the 
President of the Society, emphasizes the need to defend freedom, 
above all free speech, and points out the relevance of the quotations 
in helping us to think about today’s problems. She reminds readers 
that living in a country in which everyone can express, publish and 
broadcast their opinions freely, while respecting both others and the 
laws, is a reality which must be defended daily by all available demo-
cratic means, and she ends with the following words: «En dignes 
héritiers des écrivains des Lumières, sachons être à la hauteur, 






comme citoyens, de la société à laquelle nous aspirons, voilà peut-être 
la leçon à tirer des textes qui suivent, le feu qu’il nous faut entretenir, 
le legs précieux qu’il nous revient de transmettre aux générations 
futures»1. 
It would be difficult to criticize such a publication or such senti-
ments, which express the horror provoked by the barbarity of what 
happened and the revulsion at the assassination of the journalists 
simply because of what they published. The immense demonstrations 
in Paris and elsewhere on 11th January reflected the same revulsion 
against unthinking violence and the feeling that it was necessary to 
defend the freedom of thought and expression. But, while the interest 
in eighteenth-century writers is obviously welcome, I think we do 
need to reflect more on the reference to the Enlightenment and to 
the combat of Voltaire and others in the context of these events. I 
would therefore like to discuss in this article some of the issues arising 
from this reference to the eighteenth-century campaign for toleration, 
and more generally to reflect on how we understand ‘the Enlighten-
ment’ and read eighteenth-century texts. 
In a recent symposium published by Migration and Citizenship, Phil-
lipe Marlière analyses the references to freedom of expression, in-
cluding on the part of the French government, in the aftermath of the 
attacks2. He looks at the rhetoric of the “universal values” of France 
and the French Revolution, in particular toleration and laïcité, and 
the extent to which they represent not universalism but a particular, 
“majority communautarianism” and “Franco-centred values and 
norms”. He also points out: «Reducing the Charlie Hebdo attacks to a 
question of freedom of speech allows the government to ignore the 
disastrous socio-economic context in which some young French peo-
ple become murderers»3. This is a very important point, but not the 
subject of my article. I do not wish to discuss here the reactions to 
	
1 Tolérance: le combat des Lumières, Société Française d’Étude du Dix-Huitième 
Siècle, 2015, p. 6. 
2 Ph. Marlière, The Charlie Hebdo Sequel: the Making of a Republican McCarthyism?, 
«Migration and Citizenship. Newsletter of the American Political Science Associa-
tion Organized Section on Migration and Citizenship», 3, 2015, no. 2, pp. 18-24; 
<http://community.apsanet.org/MigrationCitizenship> (accessed 19.7.15). 
3 Ibidem, p. 22. 
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these events in France or the extent to which France has seen since 
then a greater attack on freedom of speech rather than its defence, as 
several observers claim4. Instead I would like in what follows to re-
flect on the reference to “the Enlightenment” and “Enlightenment 
values”, including the defence of toleration, to propose a different 
approach to enlightenment and to think about its relevance in rela-
tion to the challenges we face today5.  
I would also like to link my remarks on the Sfeds publication to the 
similar feelings expressed in 2013 by Anthony Pagden in the book to 
which the title of my article refers: The Enlightenment and why it still 
matters. As the book’s title indicates, Pagden believes the Enlighten-
ment to be relevant and to be at the root of much that is admirable 
today. He writes, for example:  
If we regard ourselves as modern, if we are forward-thinking, if we are 
tolerant and generally open-minded, if stem-cell research does not frighten 
us but fundamentalist religious beliefs do, then we tend to think of our-
selves as ‘enlightened’. And in thinking that we are in effect declaring our-
selves to be the heirs, however distant, of one particular intellectual and 
cultural movement6.  
Part of his aim is to oppose the arguments of critics who adopt the 
stance of Horkheimer and Adorno, generally considered to have 
rendered the Enlightenment’s emphasis on reason responsible for the 
horrors of modernity, in particular Fascism and Nazism. He refers to 
the post-colonialists who denounce the Enlightenment as the apothe-
osis of rationalism and claim its defence of universal emancipation is 
	
4 Marlière cites E. Todd, Qui est Charlie? Sociologie d’une crise religieuse, Seuil, Paris 
2015, and E. Plenel, Contre la surveillance, la question démocratique, «Mediapart», 29 
April 2015.  
5 It is indeed striking that references to ‘the Enlightenment’ proliferate, and they 
are used in sometimes surprising ways. To give but one recent example: in an 
interview for «Le Monde», Donald Tusk, as President of the European Council, 
declared in relation to the Greek crisis: «En Europe, nous avons trop de Rousseau 
et Voltaire et trop peu de Montesquieu. Voilà ce que je pense du débat aujourd’hui 
en Europe», «Le Monde», 18 July 2015. 
6 A. Pagden, The Enlightenment and why it still matters, Oxford University Press, Ox-





a cloak for Western cultural imperialism7. For Pagden, on the contra-
ry, 
What can be attributed to [the Enlightenment ...] is the broadly secular, 
experimental, individualistic, and progressive intellectual world [...] – a 
world in which old and apparently unassailable forms of association, of 
belief and tradition, which had for centuries divided human beings into 
mutually suspicious and often brutally homicidal groups, were slowly and 
painfully, but irreversibly, abandoned8.  
Unlike many other historians, he does believe that one can identify 
an ‘Enlightenment Project’, summed up more or less as secularism 
and belief in universal human nature9 or an ‘Enlightenment science 
of man’ represented by Condorcet’s cosmo-politanism, with which 
the book opens. For Pagden the Enlightenment «was about creating 
a field of values, political, social, and moral, based upon a detached 
and scrupulous understanding – as far as the human mind is capable 
– of what it means to be human. And today, most educated people, 
at least in the West, broadly accept the conclusions to which it led»10. 
One might consider this last statement to be somewhat optimistic, in 
view of the current dominance of narrowly economic over other con-
siderations in the conduct of affairs and in the values defended today 
by many ‘educated people’, particularly in the West. In addition, 
note the qualification in that sentence: the belief in universal human 
nature and universal values seems to be the preserve of the ‘West’, 
and the Enlightenment seems to be the product of the Christian 
West, stimulated by the Protestant Reformation. Pagden goes on to 
discuss the history of the Moslem world, describing how the devel-
opment of science and philosophy was interrupted at the end of the 
Twelfth Century by ‘the Muslim clergy’, so that there was no enlight-
enment in the Moslem world, with the results that we can see11. 
Pagden’s view of Enlightenment bears similarities to Jonathan Isra-
el’s presentation of what he calls the ‘Radical Enlightenment’, viewed 
	
7 Ibidem, pp. 13-15. 
8 Ibidem, p. viii. 
9 Ibidem, p. 17. 
10 Ibidem, p. 343. 
11 Ibidem, pp. 345-348. 
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as the origin of everything that is valuable in modernity – despite the 
very many differences between the two authors’ interpretations, in-
cluding their views on the link between Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution12. They share nevertheless a hostility towards 
postmodernism and religion and, despite their universalist claims, a 
teleological view of the Enlightenment combined with a diffusionist 
view of it originating in the West thanks to the overthrowing of the 
power of religion, with a particular emphasis on events and thinkers 
in France. This of course brings us on to much broader issues than 
the simple championing of toleration with which I began. But these 
statements and attitudes seem to me to share a similar problem, if we 
look at the challenges faced by us today, in that there is an implicit 
assumption of ‘our’ superiority as heirs to the Enlightenment, seen as 
a clearly Good Thing. While I am far from sharing many of the 
postmodern criticisms of the Enlightenment, which are very often ill-
informed and a-historical, I do believe that we need to think more 
critically about the past. The view that the only option we have is a 
choice between denunciation of the Enlightenment on the one hand, 
and defensive encomium of it on the other, is highly regrettable, quite 
apart from the very problematic belief in a single Enlightenment, 
embodying a unified Project, which is difficult to substantiate. 
I would like to begin with this last question, namely the problem 
with the category of ‘the Enlightenment’, which has much exercised 
scholars in recent years. I do not wish to rehearse yet again the dif-
ferent arguments in favour of one or multiple enlightenments (wheth-
er national or radical, moderate and so on)13, which have arguably 
skewed a lot of scholarship. One might even argue that it might be 
better to abandon the label altogether in favour of a simple reference 
	
12 J.I. Israel, The Radical Enlightenment, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001; En-
lightenment Contested, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006; Democratic Enlightenment, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011. 
13 Such as R. Porter, M. Teich (eds.), The Enlightenment in National Context, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 1981; J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 
I: The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, 1737-1764, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1999; J. Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment. Scotland and Naples 






to the period under study (as in the title chosen for this journal), and 
perhaps look at what individuals actually meant when they referred 
to the age as ‘enlightened’. One can be equally sceptical about the 
existence of something called an ‘Enlightenment Project’14. It could 
doubtless be argued that there was a group of people in Paris in the 
mid-to late-Eighteenth Century who shared a common outlook and 
aims despite differences between them on particular points – as there 
was also a group of like-minded thinkers in Edinburgh in the second 
half of the century, or in Milan, for example – but the outlook and 
aims of these different groups, while similar in many ways, were not 
identical. There also existed a large number of thinking people who 
identified with a broad conception of ‘enlightened’ ideas and atti-
tudes without buying into any particular ‘project’ and while disagree-
ing profoundly with the Parisian ‘philosophes’. There were many 
thinking people, in many different countries, who supported legal 
and other reforms, and who opposed absolutism and religious intol-
erance and oppression, while being sincerely religious. These people, 
often minor figures little-known today, arguably contributed power-
fully to a gradual shift in public opinion, making it more receptive to 
certain reforms15. They espoused a variety of opinions covering a 
	
14 See R. Wokler, The Enlightenment Project and its critics, in S.E. Liedman (ed.), The 
Postmodernist Critique of the Project of Enlightenment, Rodopi, Amsterdam 1997 (Poznan 
Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 58), pp. 1-30. 
15 This was the case for many of the Huguenots who played an important role in 
spreading more tolerant ideas, such as Pierre Des Maizeaux in London or Jean-
Henri-Samuel Formey in Berlin, or lesser known figures such as Michel de La 
Roche, on whom see A. Thomson, In defence of toleration. La Roche’s Bibliothèque 
angloise and Mémoires littéraires de la Grande-Bretagne, in A. Thomson, S. Bur-
rows, E. Dziembowski (eds.), Cultural transfers: France and Britain in the long eighteenth 
century, Voltaire Foundation, Oxford 2010 (SVEC 2010: 4), pp. 161-174. I have also 
discussed the Dijon scholar Jean Bouhier and his correspondence with the Neu-
châtel scientist Louis Bourguet in Questioning Church Doctrine in Private Correspondence 
in the Eighteenth Century: Jean Bouhier’s Doubts Concerning the Soul, in A. Dunan-Page, C. 
Prunier (eds.) Debating the Faith: Religion and Letter Writing in Great Britain, 1550-1800, 
Springer, Dordrecht 2013, pp. 195-208, and the activities of the Lausanne aristo-
crat Seigneux de Cor-revon in Traduction et journalisme chez les intermédiaires culturels au 
18e siècle to appear in a collective volume published by Vandenhoek and Ruprecht 
in 2016. But many other examples could be given. 
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relatively large spectrum and often held beliefs which to us would 
seem contradictory. Religious or philosophical ‘radicalism’, for ex-
ample, frequently accompanied political conformism or defence of 
moderate reforms. It is as a consequence difficult to classify educated 
or thinking people in the Eighteenth Century into pre-defined and 
homogeneous categories. At the same time, while there were clearly 
national differences (the ‘Enlightenment’ is not exactly the same thing 
as ‘les Lumières’, ‘die Aufklärung’, ‘l’Illuminismo’, and so on), there 
was also a circulation of ideas and works (and not necessarily a diffu-
sion from a single centre); despite adapting foreign texts to local cir-
cumstances, many educated people undoubtedly felt themselves part 
of an international ‘Republic of letters’. National enlightenments 
were therefore not self-contained or watertight. In addition, in this 
context, the definition of the ‘nation’ is problematical for the Eight-
eenth Century, which further complicates the issue. I would therefore 
prefer – rather than attempting to define different types of enlight-
enment as a way of countering claims concerning the existence of a 
single ‘Enlightenment’ (in whatever language one chooses to express 
it) – to emphasize the diversity of opinions and values; in other 
words, ‘enlightened’ attitudes could correspond to a variety of com-
binations and permutations of individual positions. 
One can however, I think, identify a certain number of questions 
that particularly exercised thinking people in the Eighteenth Century 
and to which a range of answers was proposed. These questions cen-
tred of course around the nature of mankind, and life in society and 
its organisation; this is what Antony Pagden defines as the Enlight-
enment’s science of man, while in the Eighteenth Century these ques-
tions were sometimes grouped under the heading of the ‘natural his-
tory of man’ (or mankind)16. The range of questions covered was 
large, from the functioning of the brain and the exist-ence of the soul 
and the natural varieties of humans and their relations to animals, to 
the origins and history of societies, morality, society’s laws, political 
economy and government. The general aim was to understand the 
	
16 See Pagden, The Enlightenment, pp. 17-18. In using ‘man’, I am adopting eight-
eenth-century usage, but the word should always be taken to refer to human beings 





functioning (often seen in terms of the laws governing the function-
ing) of human beings and human society. Rather than following cus-
tomary views or those dictated by authorities of various types, those 
who considered themselves ‘enlightened’ tried to adopt a more scien-
tific attitude, relying largely on observation. To that extent, the atti-
tude was secular in that it did not start from religious principles and 
often put religion to one side, but that does not mean that it was nec-
essarily antireligious. Many ‘enlightened’ thinkers believed that these 
observations and conclusions could be reconciled with the doctrines 
taught by their religion17. We therefore find a large diversity of con-
clusions from these observations. As a result, it is I believe more use-
ful to talk of enlightened attitudes rather than an ‘Enlightenment 
Project’. It is also important to remember that these attitudes con-
cerned behaviour as well as philosophical positions. For many, the 
natural extension of these attitudes was an involvement in concrete 
reforms, or ‘applied Enlightenment’, which increased as the century 
progressed18. At the least, a commitment to public debate and to 
informing and ‘enlightening’ public opinion was an integral part of 
enlightened attitudes. While not going as far as some recent scholars 
who have seen this as the essential aspect of enlightenment19, it is 
obvious that careful attention needs to be paid to it. It was of course 
at the heart of projects like the Encyclopédie, but also drove much of 
the development of journalism in the period. Amongst those who 
were particularly involved in informing the reading public and in 
contributing to spreading new ideas were French Huguenot exiles in 
various Eu-ropean countries, whose activity in the fields of journalism 
	
17 Certain scholars have even recently attempted to reclaim the Enlightenment 
for religion, for example D. Sorkin, The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and 
Catholics from London to Vienna, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ) 2008. I 
do not however believe that it is useful to create yet another separate category of 
enlightenment. 
18 See A.I. Macinnes, Applied Enlightenment: its Scottish limitations in the eighteenth cen-
tury, in J.F. Dunyach, A. Thomson (eds.), The Enlightenment in Scotland: national and 
international perspectives, Voltaire Foundation, Oxford 2015, pp. 21-58. 
19 See for example C. Siskin, W. Warner (eds.), This is Enlightenment, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 2010, which defines Enlightenment as an event in the 
history of mediation. 
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and translation has attracted quite a lot of critical attention20. It is 
worth pointing out that the group of Huguenots around Pierre Des 
Maizeaux in England in the first part of the Eighteenth Century, and 
their contacts in Holland, organised the translation into French of 
works by English Latitudinarian theologians, and their distribution, 
as a way of counteracting intolerant Catholic arguments. In a similar 
vein, Jean Henri Samuel Formey, secretary of the Berlin Academy of 
Sciences in the later Eighteenth Century, who directed a large num-
ber of periodicals and translated many works, saw himself as a Chris-
tian philosopher combating irreligious philosophes21. He never-theless 
developed his own project for an encyclopaedia, afterwards giving 
the articles he had written to the editors of the Encyclopédie22. It would 
be difficult to deny that he saw himself as espousing certain enlight-
ened values, reconcilable with Christian belief. 
That said, is the claim that these attitudes can be seen as the origin 
of what we value most about modernity – or that the Eighteenth 
Century has uniquely bequeathed to us a set of admirable values that 
we must defend – a valid position from which to approach the study 
of eighteenth-century works? As I have already indicated, many of 
those who admire the ‘Enlightenment’ adopt a teleological (or 
‘Whig’) point of view, seeing the period as a crucial moment in a 
process of steady improvement, of which we are the heirs. This also 
encourages an uncritical attitude towards those ideas and thinkers 
defined as being part of the Enlightenment, however defined. Such 
	
20 See in particular J. Sgard (ed.), Dictionnaire de la Presse, 4 vols, Voltaire Founda-
tion, Oxford 1991, 1999. On translation, see F. Oz-Salzburger, The Enlightenment in 
translation: regional and European aspects, «European Review of History/Revue Eu-
ropéenne d’histoire», 13, 2006, no. 3, pp. 385-409, and my articles: Locke Stillingfleet 
et Coste: la philosophie en extraits, in G. Imbruglia, R. Minuti, L. Simonutti (a cura di), 
Traduzione e circolazione delle idee nella cultura europea tra ’500 e ’700, Bibliopolis, Napoli 
2007, pp. 135-162; Des Maizeaux, Collins and the translators: the case of Collins’ Philo-
sophical inquiry concerning human liberty, in Cultural transfers: France and Britain in 
the long eighteenth century, pp. 219-231. 
21 This is currently being studied by Annelie Grosse in a doctoral thesis being 
prepared at the EUI.  
22 See for example F.A. Kafker, J. Loveland, Antoine-Claude Briasson and 






an uncritical attitude can itself be seen as a betrayal of those very 
thinkers we profess to admire. It also runs the danger of imposing on 
the past our present conceptions of what we consider to be ‘forward-
looking’ or ‘modern’ attitudes while ignoring both possible ambigui-
ties inherent in them and the extent to which these attitudes and 
judgements have been shaped by more recent history. It is surely 
more useful to try to understand what eighteenth-century thinkers 
were trying to do and why they came to the conclusions they did, 
without ignoring or trying to explain away what may seem to us to be 
inconsistencies, contradictions or black spots. 
In what follows I shall look briefly at some of the questions that 
preoccupied people in the Eighteenth Century and the different an-
swers given to these questions, including their less welcome implica-
tions. However far this may apparently take us from my starting-
point, it is important to look at particular examples in order to make 
my argument clear and to avoid misunderstandings. I hope it will be 
evident from what follows that my aim is neither to defend nor to 
attack these writers, but to try to understand them and what they 
were trying to do. 
Thinking about humans  
One important aspect of eighteenth-century concerns was, as we 
have seen, the science of man or the ‘natural history of man’, in other 
words, discussion of what it means to be human; this includes, on the 
one hand, the question of humans’ physical make-up and the exist-
ence of the soul, and on the other, and linked to it, that of human 
varieties, including perceptions of and behaviour towards the ‘Other’ 
and thus the toleration (or not) of perceived difference. The eight-
eenth-century discussion of human nature not only covered a wide 
variety of subjects but also led to a variety of conclusions. Those who 
attempted to explain all of human functions in purely material terms 
(i.e., those generally termed materialists) adopted a position in open 
conflict with orthodox Christian teaching concerning the existence of 
an immaterial and immortal soul and, by the mid Eighteenth Centu-
ry, increasingly denied the existence of God. Thus these materialists 
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have generally been considered as the most radical of eighteenth-
century thinkers. Whether in a certain Marxist tradition or in studies 
of the ‘radical Enlightenment’, they have often been described as 
being at the origin of radically democratic ideas and ‘progressive’ 
thought in all fields23. When one looks more carefully, however, it 
immediately becomes clear that such an inter-pretation, based on a 
teleological view imposing our modern conceptions on the past, is 
unsustainable. Firstly, none of the eighteenth-century materialists 
questioned the bases of society; in Ethocratie (1776) baron d’Holbach, 
the leading propagandist for atheistic materialism, made a series of 
reform proposals which, encouraged by Turgot’s administration, he 
looked to the monarch to apply24. And although Denis Diderot did 
support the American revolutionaries, called in 1780 for a slave re-
volt in the sugar colonies, and finally looked to revolution as the only 
way to regenerate an irremediably corrupt society25, this seems to 
have been mainly the result of despair at the failure of hopes for re-
form rather than an inevitable consequence of his materialism. In-
deed, until at least 1765 (that is, long after he had elaborated the 
foundations of his materialistic conception of humans) he was a de-
fender of absolute monarchy, as the sovereign represents the general 
will26, and in the early 1770s, when he was denouncing tyranny and 
defending revolution, he continued to distrust the uneducated ‘peo-
ple’27. It is difficult to see that a materialistic view of humans led nec-
essarily to a ‘radical’ or even a republican political position. The Eng-
lish chemist Joseph Priestley developed in the late 1770s a sort of 
	
23 This is of course the argument defended by Jonathan Israel (see note 9) as well 
as someone like P. Charbonnat, Histoire des philosophies matérialistes, Syllepse, Paris 
2007. 
24 P.-H. Thiry d’Holbach, Œuvres philosophiques, vol. III, Éd. Alive, Paris 1998-
2001, pp. 593-594. 
25 See G. Goggi, Diderot et Médée dépeçant le vieil Eson, and Le dernier Diderot et la pre-
mière révolution anglaise. Modèles de révolution dans l’Histoire des Deux Indes, in De 
l’Encyclopédie à l’éloquence républicaine. Etude sur Diderot et autour de Diderot, H. 
Champion, Paris 2013, pp. 457-80 and 481-536. 
26 See A. Strugnell, Diderot’s Politics: A Study of the Evolution of Diderot’s Political 
Thought after the Encyclopédie, Nijhoff, La Haye 1973, p. 9; J. Proust, Diderot et 
l’Encyclopédie, Albin Michel, Paris 19952, p. 20. 





‘Christian ma-terialism’ independently of his radical political posi-
tions28, while the deist Thomas Paine, author of Rights of Man (1791-
92), was an authentic democrat and republican29. And if we go back 
to the most deliberately provocative French materialist of the 1740s, 
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, his extreme form of physical determin-
ism and denial of any moral values led him to support existing gov-
ernments in order to ensure social order30.   
More surprisingly, perhaps, a materialistic view of humans could 
form the basis for a view of them as naturally unequal; one might 
even claim that those who paid attention to the ways we are affected 
by inherent differences in physical organization were more willing to 
accept a certain innate inequality in individual capacities. La Mettrie 
believed that only a few individuals with favoured organisms could 
attain both moral integrity and a certain intellectual capacity, while 
the great majority need to be controlled by organised religion and 
fear31. This belief in human inequality is echoed in d’Holbach’s Sys-
tème de la nature (1770), the famous campaigning work in favour of 
atheism and materialism, which attributes differences in intellectual 
faculties to mainly physical factors, both internal and external. The 
resulting inequality is one of the foundations of society as it means 
that no-one can subsist alone and that we all need others32. In Poli-
tique naturelle (1773) d’Holbach argues that as nature has given people 
different capacities and strength, society should also treat its members 
differently according to their usefulness, faculties, and virtues; laws 
	
28 J. Priestley, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit, J. Johnson, London 1777. 
29 Paine’s Age of Reason, 1794, was a critique of the Bible from a deistic point of 
view. 
30 A. Thomson, Materialism and Society, Droz, Geneva 1981. However, he died 
young at the court of Frederick II in Potsdam and might possibly have changed his 
position in the circumstances of the second half of the century, and had he been 
less dependent on that monarch’s protection. 
31 See in particular the «Discours préliminaire» to his Oeuvres philosophiques, in 
Thomson, Materialism and Society. 
32 Holbach, Système de la nature, vol. I, Fayard, Paris 1990, pp. 150-151. 
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should however ensure that no one takes undue advantage of their 
situation33.  
In addition, such arguments could be extended from individuals to 
human groups; it is therefore possible to link materialism to claims 
concerning the intellectual inferiority of particular ‘races’. Although 
La Mettrie did not touch on this question, confining himself to his 
own society, others did. In this respect the thought of Denis Diderot 
is an especially interesting case. He criticised Claude-Adrien Helvéti-
us’s insistence on the essential similarity of humans, pointing out 
instead the great and irremediable variety of individual organiza-
tion34. Coupled with physiological determinism, this entailed a belief 
in the natural inequality of individuals. This analysis could be trans-
posed to groups and encourage the idea that savage ‘races’ could not 
progress towards the same degree of civilization as Europeans, de-
termined as they were by their physical make-up. Diderot does seem 
on occasion to have accepted the idea of the intellectual inequality of 
different human varieties35. Such a view could be reinforced by the 
notion of an uninterrupted chain of beings36 according to which hu-
mans are part of nature like other animals from which they differ 
only in degree not kind. This was one of the arguments used by ma-
terialists to deny the existence of an immaterial and immortal soul, 
said to distinguish humans from the beasts. La Mettrie had claimed 
that if one could teach a great ape or orang-outan to speak (which he 
seemed to think possible in view of the physical similarities between 
them) then there would be no difference between the ape and a hu-
man being, an idea echoed by Diderot in Le Rêve de d’Alembert37. In the 
	
33 Holbach, Politique naturelle ou Discours sur les vrais principes du gouvernement, Fayard, 
Paris 1998, pp. 162-163. 
34 Diderot, Œuvres complètes, éd. par H. Dieckmann, J. Proust, J. Varloot, Her-
mann, Paris 1975- (= DPV), vol. IX, pp. 308-309. 
35 Diderot, Révolution de l’Amérique anglaise, in Diderot, Mélanges et morceaux divers. 
Contributions à l’Histoire des Deux Indes, a cura di G. Goggi, Università di Siena, Siena 
1977, p. 149; see Proust, Diderot et l’Encyclopédie, p. 417. 
36 See A.O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge (MA) 1936, ch. 6, 8, 9. 
37 La Mettrie, L’Homme machine, ed. A. Vartanian, Princeton University Press, 





Encyclopédie article «Animal» Diderot rejected the distinction made by 
Buffon between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom (based in 
part on the fact that humans have a soul) in favour of an uninterrupt-
ed chain of beings, describing how the faculty of thinking gradually 
diminishes as one goes down the chain and disappears somewhere 
between the animal and vegetable kingdoms38. Diderot refused to 
classify species, claiming it was difficult to pinpoint where humanity 
ends and ‘animality’ begins, and unlike Buffon he considered species 
to be artificial entities or mere names, as all beings come from one 
single prototype39. In the Rêve de d’Alembert, Diderot makes the dream-
ing mathematician d’Alembert say that there is only one great indi-
vidual – «totality» – and as everything is in a state of perpetual flux, 
other species may appear40. The individual, who is composed of per-
petually moving molecules, is a possibly changing part of the whole. 
To support this point of view, he invoked the authority of Dr Peter 
Camper, who in 1770 described how the different human varieties 
could be distinguished by measuring their facial angle; he provided 
drawings of the skulls of a monkey, an orang-outang, an African, a 
Kalmuck (whom he called «the ugliest thing in nature»), a European 
and a classical statue, although Camper followed Buffon in maintain-
ing a dividing line between humans and animals41. In his medical 
notes, Diderot interpreted Camper’s ideas to fit his own belief in the 
continuity of nature, making the great ape an intermediary between 
humans and animals42.  
Diderot wanted to show the unity of nature and the continuity of all 
beings, but the removal of the dividing line between humans and 
animals was used by others to demote to the level of animals certain 
human groups considered to be at the bottom of the ladder43. It was 
	
38 Ibidem, vol. V, pp. 388-389. 
39 Ibidem, vol. IX, p. 37. 
40 Ibidem, vol. XVII, pp. 128, 138-139. 
41 Petrus Camper, Dissertation sur les variétés naturelles qui caractérisent la physiono-mie 
des hommes des divers climats et des différens ages, Francart, Paris 1792, p. 19ff.  
42 Diderot, DPV, vol. XVII, pp. 321, 326. 
43 See e.g. J.Ph. Rousselot de Surgy, Mélanges intéressans et curieux ou Abrégé d’histoire 
naturelle, morale, civique et politique, de l’Asie, l’Afrique, et des terres polaires, 10 voll., Du-
rand, Paris 1763-1765, vol. X, p. 166. 
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of course later a frequent argument of nineteenth-century materialis-
tic anthropologists, who did draw conclusions about the innate infe-
riority of certain races, and some of whom looked to Diderot as a 
precursor44. Diderot himself did not draw racist conclusions from 
these arguments and, perhaps deliberately, chose not to develop these 
questions further, probably because of his opposition to slavery and 
because those who defended the institution increasingly used argu-
ments based on the supposed natural inferiority of Africans45. He 
preferred instead to turn to the historical question of the development 
of societies and the different stages of civilisation, which explain the 
observed differences between peoples. At the same time he empha-
sized the basic similarities of all human beings and their social devel-
opment rather than what distinguished human varieties46.  
Before looking at this latter question, it is important to make clear 
the gist of my argument here, which is not that materialism led to 
racism. My purpose is simply to point out that a variety of conclu-
sions can be drawn from a materialistic conception of humans, which 
did not automatically found a ‘progressive’, egalitarian or democratic 
political position. The natural history of man could and did on occa-
sion lend support to hierarchical racial classification, and even, with 
someone like Bory de Saint-Vincent at the turn of the century, to 
polygenesis47. But although abbé Grégoire, the pro-revolutionary 
campaigner against slavery, did claim that materialism favoured ra-
cial hierarchy and slavery48, there was no lack of pro-slavery apolo-
gists who were dualists and Christians. J.J. Virey, for example, a vital-
ist opponent of materialists, published a Histoire naturelle du genre hu-
main, in which he included La Mettrie amongst those quoted in sup-
port of his claim that savages belong to the monkey family, and dwelt 
	
44 Ch. Letourneau, Science et matérialisme, C. Reinwald, Paris 1879, p. 83. 
45 See A. Thomson, Issues at stake in eighteenth-century racial classification, «Studi Sette-
centeschi», 21, 2001, pp. 223-244. 
46 See A. Thomson, Diderot, le matérialisme et la division de l’espèce humaine, «Re-
cherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie», 26, 1999, pp. 197-211. 
47 J.-B. Bory de Saint-Vincent, L’homme (homo). Essai zoologique sur le genre humain, 
Rey et Gravier, Paris 1827. 
48 See A. Thomson, Grégoire et l’unité de l’espèce humaine, «Revue française d’Histoire 





at length on the superiority of the European race49. It would hence be 
difficult to say that one philo-sophical position concerning human 
nature was inherently and consistently more ‘progressive’ than an-
other. 
As I have indicated, Diderot may well have realised the dangers in-
herent in extending arguments concerning physical determinism 
from individuals to groups of humans, and preferred instead to em-
phasize the similarities between all members of the human race. This 
is part of what is often referred to as ‘Enlightenment universalism’ 
and denounced by certain critics as simply a Eurocentric construc-
tion, imposing European views on the rest of the world50. But this 
notion is again polyvalent and cannot be so easily classified. The 
belief in the inherent equality of all humans due to their essential 
physical similarity, despite individual variations, formed the basis, for 
many eighteenth-century thinkers, for treating all people equally and 
for condemning slavery and colonial exploitation. Diderot’s claim, in 
his Encyclopédie article «Droit naturel» that as we are by nature rea-
sonable, unlike animals, we can discover the truth by reason, leads 
him to find the solution to the problem of morality in the general will 
of humans. This is the basis for natural law. This general will is found 
«in the principles of prescribed law of all civilised nations; in the so-
cial practices of savage and barbarous peoples; in the tacit agree-
ments obtaining amongst the enemies of mankind», and even in in-
stinctive feeling. This leads him to a certain number of conclusions 
based on the essential similarity of all humans all over the world, 
which all come down to the general interest and common human 
desires, discovered by the use of reason, as the foundation for laws51. 
Self-interest is combined with humans’ essential sociability, based on 
their physiology52. Elsewhere Diderot claims that the basis for morali-
	
49 J.J. Virey, Histoire naturelle du genre humain, F. Dufart, Paris an X, pp. 91, 146-
147. 
50 See the discussion in D. Carey, L. Festa (eds.), The Postcolonial Enlightenment, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford 2009. 
51 Diderot, Political Writings, ed. J. Hope Mason, R. Wokler, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1992, pp. 18-19. 
52 See Strugnell, Diderot’s Politics, p. 20. Jacques Proust emphasizes Diderot’s un-
changing belief in natural sociability in Diderot et l’Encyclopédie, pp. 408-416. 
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ty can be found in the similar physical organisation of all humans, 
which means that we have common needs. Thus «morality is enclo-
sed within the species»53. And in his Supplément au voyage de Bougainville, 
written in the early 1770s, one of the characters remarks: «Nous 
n’apportons en naissant qu’une similitude d’organisation avec 
d’autres êtres, les mêmes besoins, de l’attrait vers les mêmes plaisirs, 
une aversion pour les mêmes peines, ce qui constitue l’homme ce 
qu’il est et doit fonder la morale qui lui convient»54. Diderot’s belief 
in the existence of a universal morality based on a «constant, univer-
sal, physical cause» is behind the political positions he developed in 
the texts written for inclusion in abbé Raynal’s Histoire des deux Indes. 
He talks of 
la similitude d’organisation d’un homme à un autre, similitude 
d’organisation qui entraine celle des mêmes besoins, des mêmes plaisirs, 
des mêmes peines, de la même force, de la même faiblesse; source de la 
nécessité de la société ou d’une lutte commune et concertée contre des 
dangers communs et naissant du sein de la nature même qui menace 
l’homme de cent côtés différents. Voilà l’origine des liens particuliers et 
des vertus domestiques; voilà l’origine des liens généraux et des vertus pu-
bliques; voilà la source de la notion d’une utilité personnelle et publique; 
voilà la source de tous les pactes individuels et de toutes les lois; voilà la 
cause de la force de ces lois dans une nation pauvre et menacée; voilà la 
cause de leur faiblesse dans une nation tranquille et opulente; voilà la 
cause de leur presque nullité d’une nation à une autre55. 
Belief in a universal human nature was not, however, shared by all 
the French materialists. Helvétius, who considered individual human 
organisation to be so similar that innate individual differences were 
insignificant, nevertheless believed that humans were determined by 
external factors, above all education and laws. As a result he did not 
believe in a common universal human nature. Such a belief is never-
	
53 Diderot, DPV, vol. XVI, pp. 87, 201-205. In the Rêve de D’Alembert, however, 
Diderot imagines the appearance and disappearance of species, which are not 
fixed, which might undermine this basis for morality. 
54 Diderot, DPV, vol. XII, p. 630. See Proust, Diderot et l’Encyclopédie, p. 387. 
55 Diderot, Pensées détachées, ou Fragments politiques échappés du portefeuille d’un philo-
sophe, éd. G. Goggi, Hermann, Paris 2011, p. 112, and see Goggi’s commentary on 





theless often considered to be an essential element of ‘the Enlighten-
ment’, linked in Condorcet to the idea of indefinite perfectibility56. It 
is, as I have said, at the basis of opposition to slavery and to colonial 
exploitation, including on the part of Diderot. However, at the same 
time, one cannot dismiss out of hand the observations of certain crit-
ics who claim that it was driven by specifically European notions of 
human nature and could form the basis for colonial enterprises 
aimed at bringing ‘savage’, or later ‘backward’, peoples up to Euro-
pean standards. Here again we see the ambiguity of such concep-
tions, which are neither good nor bad in themselves, but could be put 
to different uses depending on a variety of circumstances and inter-
ests. To give but one example of the dangers of generalising about 
European views of other peoples and colonial ambitions, one could 
quote a passage in Raynal’s Histoire des Deux-Indes which calls for a 
European expedition to North Africa to free its inhabitants from the 
Ottomans in order to ‘civilise’ them; this appeal is immediately fol-
lowed by another passage, written by Diderot, insisting that if this 
expedition is only to result in the exploitation and barbarity exercised 
by the Europeans in other non-European countries, then they should 
abandon such a project and stay in their own harbours57. 
I shall not go into the polemics concerning eighteenth-century atti-
tudes to slavery, which have been the subject of widely divergent and 
often ill-informed evaluations58.  Thinking about slavery needs to be 
understood in the terms of the Eighteenth Century, avoiding inter-
pretations based on our own views. Slavery was indeed for a long 
time accepted with few qualms by many thinkers, including John 
Locke, and was not condemned by Christians until well into the cen-
tury – not even by the Quakers who in the second half of the century 
	
56 On this, see for example J.P. Schandeler, Condorcet et l’invention de la perfectibilité 
indéfinie, in B. Binoche (éd.), L’homme perfectible, Champ Vallon, Seyssel 2004, pp. 
221-251. 
57 Histoire des Deux-Indes, vol. VI, Pellet, Genève 1780, pp. 56-61. 
58 See for example the polemical works by L. Sala-Molins, in particular Le Code 
noir, ou le calvaire de Canaan (1987), Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2002; the 
evidence for the opposite point of view has been laid out by J. Ehrard, Lumières et 
esclavage. L’esclavage colonial et l’opinion publique en France au XVIIIe siècle, A. Versaillé, 
Bruxelles 2008. 
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were amongst its most vocal and active opponents. But the leading 
thinkers in many different countries came in the course of the Eight-
eenth Century to condemn slavery, often adopting a gradualist 
stance, beginning with attempts to abolish the trade, in the hope that 
this would lead to the abolition of the institution itself. As we have 
seen, opposition to slavery was behind Diderot’s wariness at going 
down a path which might emphasize innate differences between hu-
mans. At the same time, the main antislavery work of the Eighteenth 
Century, read all over Europe, Raynal’s Histoire des Deux-Indes, is trav-
ersed by many contradictions, due in part to the number of contribu-
tors and the fact that Raynal copied and adapted passages from 
many different sources. On the one hand, we find that from the first 
to the third edition, the discussion of the reasons for the physical dif-
ferences between humans changes, as the condemnation of slavery is 
developed and extended; in the first edition (1770), skin colour is 
explained by innate physical differences, but in the later editions it is 
described as the effect of climatic and environmental factors. The 
aim is clearly to undermine any arguments for slavery based on a 
belief in the natural inferiority of Africans. On the other hand, many 
other passages seeming to condone the slave trade remain un-
changed59.  
If we come, finally to the question with which we began, namely 
toleration, the situation is no less ambiguous and contradictory, and 
it is significant that the notion has recently attracted increasing study. 
Many scholars now point out that the notion of ‘toleration’ needs to 
be re-thought for today’s world, to take account of the complexities 
involved in guaranteeing respect for others instead of wishing to 
make them to conform to our viewpoint, while at the same time re-
flecting on how much freedom to accord those who are themselves 
intolerant60. The terms in which the question of toleration was most 
	
59 The uncompromising denunciation of slavery is to be found in Book XI, in 
what becomes ch. 24 in the 1780 edition (vol. VI, pp. 186-222). Other anodyne 
references to slavery, which seem to condone it, are scattered throughout the 
work’s different volumes.  
60 See for example H.E. Bödeker, C. Donato, P.H. Reill (eds.), Discourses of Toler-
ance and Intolerance in the European Enlightenment, University of Toronto Press, Toron-





often posed in the Eighteenth Century involved the rights of religious 
minorities and the question of whether the state could impose a par-
ticular belief on its subjects. John Locke, one of the main references 
on the question, while arguing vigorously against interfering with 
private beliefs and advocating the free organisation of religious com-
munities within a state, nevertheless did not accord toleration to 
Catholics and atheists, on political grounds61. It is also noticeable that 
many European advocates of toleration condemned the intolerance 
of established churches while pointing to the greater toleration af-
forded to religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire62. This, it could 
be argued, underlines the fact that toleration was seen as a grant 
from the state authorities to subject minorities, or chari-table behav-
iour towards those who held erroneous views, provided they did not 
disturb public order or question the authority of the rulers. It was 
only during the Eighteenth Century that toleration took on more 
positive connotations63. The eighteenth-century campaign was pri-
marily directed against fanaticism and religious persecution (the 
event that sparked Voltaire’s pamphlet was of course the judicial 
murder of the Protestant Calas) and in favour of the freedom of indi-
vidual belief and thought rather than an unrestrained right to print 
whatever one wished. At the same time, Voltaire and others did use 
the weapon of mockery directed against superstitious religious beliefs 
and practices in order to undermine the power of their country’s 
	
W.A. Clark Memorial Library, series 8); J.C. Laursen, M.J. Villaverde (eds.), Para-
doxes of Religious Toleration in Early Modern Political Thought, Lexington Books, Lan-
ham & Plymouth 2012; Toleration Reexamined, special issue of «Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy», 14, 2011. 
61 See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration and other writings, ed. Mark Goldie, 
Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 2010, pp. 49-53. For the early Eighteenth Century, see 
more generally J. Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006. 
62 See R. Minuti, Tolleranza e islam. Aspetti di un dibattito tra ’600 e ’700, in G. Ab-
battista, R. Minuti (a cura di), Le problème de l'altérité dans la culture européenne. Anthro-
pologie, politique et religion aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2006, pp. 
195-217; and Orientalismo e idee di tolleranza nella cultura francese del primo ’700, Olschki, 
Firenze 2006. 
63 See H.E. Bödeker, Prologue: Towards a Reconstruction of the Discourse on Tolerance and 
intolerance in the Age of Enlightenment, in Discourses of Tolerance and Intolerance, pp. 17-26.  
 
(Why) does the Enlightenment matter? 
 
	 167 
church. This could on occasion take the form of what many of their 
fellow-countrymen considered to be (and what many Christians 
would still see as) blasphemy. We can all agree with Voltaire’s de-
nunciation of intolerance and insistence that we are all ‘brothers’, but 
we need to remember the circumstances inside Europe to which it 
was a reaction. It could sometimes, and can today, lead to intoler-
ance for those labelled as fanatics64. Luisa Simonutti argues that to-
day, instead of emphasizing toleration, we should look to the value of 
the notion of ‘empathy’, linking it to David Hume’s discus-sion in the 
Enquiries concerning human understanding and concerning the principles of morals 
(1751)65. One might add that a view like Diderot’s, underlining the 
physical similarities between humans all over the world, which form 
the basis for sociability and a common morality, while approaching 
the question from a different direction, is entirely compatible with 
such a viewpoint. As I have already indicated, respect for others and 
their difference is an essential part of the debate, and one which re-
ceived varied answers in the Eighteenth Century. It is impossible to 
go into the details of these arguments here, beyond pointing out the 
complexities involved in discussions of toleration, including the dan-
ger of seeing ourselves as the ‘civilised’ tolerant people opposed to the 
‘fanatics’ or the ‘barbarians’.  
Empathy includes attempts to understand the others’ point of view, 
to ‘see things their way’66. It might help us to understand why in 
many parts of today’s world, which were subjected first to coloni-
sation and more recently to invasion by the West in the name of ‘civi-
lisation’ and sometimes ‘enlightened values’, the defence of these 
values can often be received with a certain amount of scepticism. 
Declarations that the ‘fundamentalists’ hate democracy and civilisa-
	
64 See for example J.C. Laursen’s analysis of Hume in Intolerance of Fanatics in Bayle, 
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tion miss the point; for many of those young people attracted to the 
violent rhetoric of the extremists, the West’s defence of such values is 
pure hypocrisy. We should not ignore the possibility that ‘our’ ap-
peals to the ‘legacy of the Enlightenment’ and praise for its campaign 
in favour of toleration might be seen as merely a cloak for our own 
feeling of superiority and even for expansionist ambitions. However 
misguided such impressions may be, it is a mistake to close our eyes 
to their existence and ignore the possible ambiguity in our own atti-
tudes. 
Does this mean that we should abandon such values? Of course 
not. Simply that in putting the works of the past on a pedestal, in 
adopting an uncritical stance towards them, we are in fact betraying 
the principles defended by those we admire. We need to look critical-
ly at these thinkers and their works, without closing our eyes to their 
possible ambiguities and contradictions, and to understand them as 
products of their time without passing value judgements on them. 
This will help us to see how far analyses and proposals for action 
elaborated in very different circumstances can be relevant for today’s 
world. Only in this way, in addition, can we examine critically our 
own assumptions and beliefs and avoid the dangers of self-
congratulation visible in many of the reactions to the fanaticism of 
others. That is why the study of ‘the Enlightenment’ matters, but it 
must be a study informed by a deep historical understanding which 
enables us to see why the vitally important questions posed by eight-
eenth-century thinkers were posed in the way they were and received 
the variety of answers they did. A realisation of the ambiguity inher-
ent in certain of their answers can open our eyes to the diverse impli-
cations of the notions we have inherited from them. Books emphasiz-
ing the complexity of eighteenth-century thinking are less likely to 
become best-sellers than ones either praising or condemning the En-
lightenment, but they are arguably more useful in helping us to un-
derstand the past and hence the complexities and contradictions of 
our own times. 
 
